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Abstract 
We use a US Social Security reform as a quasi-experiment to provide evidence 
on framing effects in retirement behavior. The reform increased the full 
retirement age (FRA) from 65 to 66 in two month increments per year of birth 
for cohorts born from 1938 to 1943. We find strong evidence that the spike in 
the benefit claiming hazard at 65 moved in lockstep along with the FRA. Results 
on self-reported retirement and exit from employment are less clear-cut, but go 
in the same direction.  The responsiveness to the new FRA is stronger for people 
with higher cognitive skills. We interpret the findings as evidence of reference 
dependence with loss aversion. We develop a simple labor supply model with 
reference dependence that can explain the results. The model has potentially 
important implications for framing of future Social Security reforms. JEL: J26 
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1. Introduction 

Understanding the labor force, benefit take up, and saving decisions of older workers has 
become increasingly important in today’s environment of rapid population aging and large Social 
Security financial imbalances. The life cycle model provides a powerful framework for modeling 
retirement decisions, and has been the basis for a substantial amount of informative and policy-
relevant research. But some aspects of retirement behavior have proven difficult to explain in the 
life cycle framework. These include failure to take up employer-provided defined contribution 
pension  plans that provide very favorable terms such as a generous employer match (Madrian 
and Shea, 2001), and lack of knowledge of pension provisions (Chan and Stevens, 2008). 
Another feature of retirement behavior that seems hard to reconcile with a life cycle approach is 
the persistence of large spikes in exit from the labor force and take up of Social Security benefits 
(Old Age and Survivors Insurance, or OASI) in the US at age 65. Costa (1998) shows that there 
was little evidence of a  spike in labor force exit in the 1900-1920 period, but a spike at age 65 
had emerged by 1940, five years after the establishment of Social Security. The size of the spike 
was as high as 30% on an annual basis in the mid 1980's (Perrachi and Welch, 1994), and 
declined to 19% in the 2000's.4 
 Several explanations for the age 65 spike that are consistent with the life cycle framework 
have been proposed. These include (1) a liquidity constraint that makes it difficult financially for 
some low income workers to retire before becoming eligible for Social Security benefits, (2) a 
kink at age 65 in the schedule that determines the Social Security benefit as a function of the age 
                                                 
4Source: author’s calculations from the Health and Retirement Study, described below. A new 
spike in the hazard rates of labor force exit and benefit claiming emerged after 1962, when early Social 
Security entitlement at age 62 became available (Moffitt, 1987). Note that exiting employment and 
claiming the OASI benefit are distinct choices, although they are closely related in practice. The spikes in 
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of claiming, (3) the prevalence of age 65 as the normal age of retirement in many Defined 
Benefit (DB) pension plans, and (4) loss of health insurance coverage as a result of retiring 
before becoming eligible for Medicare at age 65. The evidence on these explanations (discussed 
below) is mixed, but overall it suggests that these factors cannot account for more than a small 
portion of the spike in retirement at 65, either alone or in combination. The evidence is not 
conclusive, however, because some of these explanations cannot be directly tested. 
 Other explanations for the age 65 spike have been proposed in the behavioral economics 
framework, in which the assumptions of farsighted rational behavior and standard preferences 
are relaxed. 65 was designated as the Full Retirement Age (FRA) from the beginning of the 
OASI program until recently. Workers might take this “official” designation as implicit advice 
from the government about when to retire and claim benefits, and as a result retirement at age 65 
may have become a social norm. Information provided by the Social Security Administration 
(SSA) on their web site and in individualized “accounting reports” sent directly to future 
beneficiaries is explicitly framed with reference to the FRA. To paraphrase: Your FRA is 65. If 
you continue to work until 65, your monthly benefit will be $X. If instead you claim at age 62, 
your benefit will be 80% of X. If you postpone claiming until age 70, your benefit will be 130% 
of X. This presentation could lead to framing effects at 65, resulting in age 65 becoming a 
reference point.  There is little direct evidence to date on behavioral economic explanations for 
the age 65 spike. Most of the evidence comes from testing and rejecting other explanations, 
leaving behavioral economic explanations as the default (Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise, 1996). 
  
                                                                                                                                                             
the hazard of claiming benefits at ages 62 and 65 are larger than the labor force exit spikes. 
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 A Social Security reform enacted into law in 1983 increased the FRA from 65 to 66 in 
two month increments per year of birth for cohorts born from 1938 to 1943.5 The cohorts 
affected by the reform reached their FRA in 2004-2009, so data on their retirement behavior are 
becoming available now. This provides an unusual opportunity to test both life-cycle and 
behavioral economic explanations for the age 65 spike. The increase in the FRA is equivalent to 
a cut in the Social Security benefit: claiming the benefit at any given age results in a lower 
benefit than if the FRA had not changed. This reduces the expected present discounted value of 
lifetime benefits (Social Security Wealth), and should cause an increase in the age of retirement 
if leisure is a normal good.  But, as illustrated in Figure 1, the increase in the FRA did not change 
the slope of the benefit-claiming-age schedule in the vicinity of the FRA.6 So there is no 
economic incentive for someone who, for whatever reason, would have retired or claimed the 
benefit at 65 if the FRA had not changed, to instead do so at his new FRA of 65 and 2 months, or 
65 and 4 months, etc. If the spike in retirement or benefit claiming at age 65 shifts across cohorts 
in parallel with the increase in the FRA, explanations based on the standard life cycle framework 
would be unable to account for this. This would point toward behavioral economic explanations. 
 Our first contribution in this paper is to estimate the effect of the increase in the FRA on 
the hazard of exiting employment and the hazard of claiming the OASI benefit. Several recent 
                                                 
5The FRA is 65 for cohorts born before 1938, 65 and 2 months for the 1938 birth cohort, 65 and 4 
months for the 1939 birth cohort, etc., and 66 for cohorts born from 1943-1954. A similar stepwise 
increase from 66 to 67 for cohorts born from 1955 to 1960 was also mandated. 
6The implied benefit cut is the same at all claiming ages up to and including the FRA except 
between 62 and 63. The benefit cut implied by a one year increase in the FRA is 5% if the benefit is 
claimed between 62 and 63, and 6.67% if the benefit is claimed between 63 and 66. Another reform 
enacted in 1983 gradually increased the Delayed Retirement Credit (DRC), the slope of the benefit-
claiming-age profile after the FRA, from 1% for those turning 62 in 1981 to 8% for those turning 62 in 
2005. The benefit cut implied by a one year increase in the FRA for an individual who claims the benefit 
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studies have estimated the effect of the increase in the FRA on the timing of labor force exit or 
benefit claiming (Blau and Goodstein, 2010; Kopczuck and Song, 2008; Mastrobuoni, 2009; 
Pingle, 2006; Song and Manchester, 2008), but none have focused specifically on the impact on 
the spike in retirement at 65. In the first part of the paper, we use data from the Health and 
Retirement Study (HRS) and the Longitudinal Employer-Household Data (LEHD) to analyze 
changes in the retirement and claiming hazards across cohorts. We find strong evidence that the 
spike in the OASI benefit claiming hazard moved in lockstep along with the FRA, consistent 
with findings from administrative data (Song and Manchester, 2008). Results on self-reported 
retirement and exit from the labor force are less clear-cut: we find evidence that the spike in 
labor force exit at 65 decreased substantially and in some cases vanished for cohorts whose FRA 
increased, but less systematic evidence that new spikes have appeared at the new FRAs. The 
difference between effects on claiming and labor force exit may indicate that the change in the 
FRA is less salient for leaving employment than for claiming. Depending on the outcome we 
examine, the FRA effect can account for 10 to 40% of the initial hazard at age 65. 
 These results add to the growing literature on evidence “from the field” in behavioral 
economics. By contrast with other applications of framing effects to labor supply, the FRA offers 
a particularly favorable setting: the reference is explicitly defined and then exogenously modified 
by the 1983 reform, so that the behavioral component is clearly identified from cohort 
discontinuities. 7  
Our second contribution is to address the novel question of “who is behavioral” 
(Benjamin, Brown, and Shapiro, 2006) with respect to age of retirement. This is important in 
                                                                                                                                                             
after the FRA is equal to the DRC for his cohort. 
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order to infer which of several potential behavioral economic explanations is most consistent 
with the results. We define a group of workers as behavioral if the group’s claiming and labor 
force exit behavior closely parallels the shift in the FRA. We define groups in several ways: by 
(1) socioeconomic characteristics such as gender, education, race, and marital status; (2) job 
characteristics; (3) cognitive ability; (4) financial literacy and planning horizon; and (5) non-
cognitive characteristics such as risk aversion and subjective expectations about longevity. The 
most consistent finding is that workers with higher cognitive respond more strongly to the FRA 
change. One might have expected that low cognitive skills would make an individual more likely 
to interpret the change in the FRA as advice from the SSA. However, the most plausible 
explanation for the evidence we find is reference dependence, which is a form of non standard 
preferences, as opposed to non standard decision making such as might result from low cognitive 
skill. Moreover, the lower FRA effect for workers with low cognitive ability is largely due to the 
persistence of a large spike at age 65 for this group after the reform. This suggests that people 
with lower cognitive skills may be slower to learn about the FRA change or to integrate the new 
reference point in their claiming decision, perhaps instead keeping workers from earlier cohorts 
as their reference. To summarize, both groups of workers would be “behavioral” in the sense of 
reacting to a reference point with loss aversion, but workers with lower cognitive skills would be 
slower to adjust to the new reference points.  
 The evidence we present is of inherent interest for understanding retirement behavior, but 
it could also have important implications for future Social Security policy. To illustrate these 
implications, we develop a simple behavioral model of retirement that incorporates reference 
                                                                                                                                                             
7
 For a survey of empirical applications, see Della Vigna (2009); for theoretical solutions to the 
indeterminacy of the reference point, see for instance Koszegi and Rabin (2006).  
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dependence and loss aversion. The model is used to demonstrate that reference dependence can 
amplify or dampen the impact on the average age of retirement caused by a reform such as a 
change in the FRA, depending on how the reform is framed. Simulations of the model for 
plausible parameter values indicate that the manner of framing a policy reform can have a 
sizeable effect on its impact on retirement behavior in the presence of reference dependence. 
 The next section of the paper briefly reviews previous findings and places our 
contribution in context. The following section describes the data, and sections 4 and 5 present 
evidence on the effect of the shift in the FRA. Section 6 analyzes the question of “who is 
behavioral?” Section 7 describes and analyzes the implications of a simple behavioral model of 
retirement. The final section concludes. 
 
2. Background and Previous Studies 
 Here, we briefly review evidence on explanations for the age 65 spike that are consistent 
with the standard life cycle model.  
 (1) Liquidity Constraint. Until 1962, eligibility for OASI began at age 65. Low income 
workers who saved little during their working years could face a liquidity constraint that makes it 
difficult to finance consumption during retirement before receiving the OASI benefit. This could 
explain the prevalence of retirement at the earliest age of eligibility. However, the earliest age of 
eligibility for OASI was changed to 62 in 1962, but the spike at age 65 remained and even grew, 
thus providing evidence against a liquidity constraint explanation. It is possible that liquidity 
constraints were an important source of the spike before 1962 and were gradually supplanted by 
other factors. And a liquidity constraint is a plausible explanation for the spike at age 62. 
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 (2) Nonlinear Budget Set. Until the 1990s there was a sharp kink at the FRA in the 
schedule that determines the Social Security benefit as a function of the age of claiming. 
Delaying claiming from 62 to 65 resulted in an approximately actuarially fair benefit increase 
(6.67% per year), but delaying claiming past 65 resulted in a much less than actuarially fair 
increase (1% up to 1981; 3% from 1981 until 1989). The age-65 spike could be rationalized as a 
response to a kinked intertemporal budget constraint. However, the 1983 Social Security reforms 
eliminated the kink, gradually increasing the reward to delaying claiming past the FRA from 3% 
for cohorts reaching their FRA in 1989 to 8% for cohorts reaching their FRA in 2008. By the 
mid-2000's there was no longer a kink in the benefit-claiming age schedule, and today there is 
even a slight convex kink, yet the spike in retirement at age 65 for cohorts with an FRA of 65 
persisted, suggesting that the budget constraint kink was not the main factor behind the age 65 
spike in retirement, at least in recent years.  
 (3) Defined Benefit Pensions. DB pension plans often have a normal retirement age of 
65, and these plans usually have very strong incentives to retire by the normal age (conditional 
on not having retired at the earliest age of eligibility, which is typically quite attractive as well). 
DB pensions are much less common today, having been largely supplanted by Defined 
Contribution (DC) plans.8 DC plans do not have any incentives to retire at 65 or any other 
particular age. However, the switch from DB to DC plans affected the cohorts reaching their mid 
60’s in the 2000s much less than it has affected more recent cohorts. The prevalence of DB 
                                                 
8Measured in terms of annual contributions by employers, DB plans accounted for 60% of total 
private sector employer contributions in 1980, and only 13% in 2000 (Poterba, Venti, and Wise, 2007). 
DB plans remain prevalent in the public sector. 
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pension coverage in these older cohorts is consistent with the persistence of the age 65 spike. We 
control for DB pension coverage and, for those with DB plans, the normal retirement age. 
 (4) Health Insurance. Workers who would lose their employer-provided health insurance 
upon retiring might prefer to postpone retirement until Medicare eligibility at age 65 in order to 
avoid being uninsured, leading to a spike in retirement at 65. The age of eligibility for Medicare 
has been 65 since the program was introduced in 1965, so there is no direct evidence on this 
explanation, although the age-65 spike was present before 1965. It is possible that Medicare has 
replaced the other explanations for the age-65 spike as they have become less relevant, but this is 
difficult to determine because of the lack of variation in the Medicare eligibility age.9 
  The most plausible behavioral economic explanation for the age 65 spike stems from the 
fact that 65 was the Social Security FRA until recently. The FRA is not presented as a norm – the 
SSA presents things in a balanced way: “If you retire early, you may not have enough income to 
enjoy the years ahead of you. Likewise, if you retire late, you’ll have a larger income, but fewer 
years to enjoy it. Everyone needs to find the right balance based on his or her own 
circumstances.” (SSA, 2008a). However, in personalized Social Security statements the FRA is 
explicitly used as a reference in a bar chart illustrating benefits as a function of claiming age.10 
Moreover, the distinction between retiring “early” (that is, earlier than the FRA) and retiring 
                                                 
9Evidence on the role of Medicare in retirement decisions derived from simulations based on 
structural models is provided in Rust and Phelan (1997) and Blau and Gilleskie (2006, 2008). Rust and 
Phelan conclude that Medicare was an important determinant of retirement timing in the 1970s, while 
Blau and Gilleskie conclude that it was much less important in the 1990s. 
10
 See Mastrobuoni (2010) for discussion of the history of the Social Security statement and the 
impact of its introduction on retirement behavior. 
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“late” (later than the FRA) is explicitly discussed (SSA, 2008b; see appendix). Clearly, the way 
the FRA is used in framing benefits invites people to use it as their point of reference.11  
 There is little direct evidence on the explanatory power of specific behavioral economic 
explanations for the age 65 spike. Featherstonehaugh and Ross (1999) and Liebman and Luttmer 
(2009) pose hypothetical questions to survey respondents to gauge the importance of framing 
effects in the presentation of information about Social Security. Framing effects appear to matter 
at some ages and not at other ages, but the scenarios are hypothetical. The hypothetical 
experiment we have in mind would cut Social Security benefits by a given amount, and frame 
the cut in alternative ways: (1) as a neutral across-the-board cut irrespective of the age at which 
the benefit is claimed, (2) as a cut in the benefit available at a particular reference age, holding 
constant the slope of the benefit-claiming-age profile, and (3) as an increase in the age at which a 
given reference benefit level is available, again holding the slope constant. In each scenario, 
individuals would be perfectly well informed about the cut, and capable of determining their 
optimal response, given their preferences. This would eliminate lack of information and limited 
cognitive ability as confounders, so any differences in responses across scenarios could be 
attributed to reference dependence. The actual quasi-experiment induced by the reform did hold 
the benefit-claiming-age profile roughly constant (c.f. Figure 1), and used framing option 3 (an 
increase in the FRA). We cannot compare results for different framing options and we cannot 
rule out information and cognitive ability as confounders. We discuss indirect approaches to 
assessing the importance of these issues in sections 5 and 6. 
                                                 
11
 This is true for cohorts with non-integer FRAs. For instance, for workers born in 1939, the 
statement reads: “The earliest age at which you can receive an unreduced retirement benefit is 65 and 4 
months.” 
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 Recent evidence indicates that the increase in the FRA has affected retirement behavior. 
Mastrobuoni (2009) analyzed the age of exit from the labor force of the “treated” cohorts, 
comparing them to earlier cohorts not affected by the increase in the FRA. His estimates indicate 
that each two month increase in the FRA caused a one month increase in retirement age. Blau 
and Goodstein (2010) and Pingle (2006) also estimate that the increase in the FRA has caused an 
increase in employment at older ages. The evidence in these three studies does not address the 
mechanism through which the FRA effect operates, and therefore does not shed light on the 
question of why the FRA has affected retirement behavior. The evidence is consistent with a 
wealth effect that would alter behavior at all ages, but it does not address the question of whether 
there is a shift in the spike at age 65.  
 In contrast, recent evidence on Social Security claiming clearly suggests a behavioral 
economic interpretation. There is no economic incentive to claim the OASI benefit at the FRA, 
yet that is precisely what the treated cohorts have done. Song and Manchester (2008) and 
Kopczuck and Song (2008) use administrative data to show that the increase in the FRA has 
caused the spike in claiming at age 65 to shift almost completely to the new FRA for the affected 
cohorts. This finding is difficult to explain in the life cycle framework. The key unanswered 
questions that we seek to address are whether there is similar evidence for employment; if so, 
how can we explain it; and who is “behavioral.”  
 
3. Data 
Previous studies of the impact of the FRA have used data from the Current Population 
Survey (Blau and Goodstein, 2010; Mastrobuoni, 2009), the Survey of Income and Program 
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Participation (Pingle, 2006), and SSA administrative data (Song and Manchester, 2008; Kopczuk 
and Song, 2008). These data sources provide large sample sizes, which may be needed to detect 
the effects of small changes in the FRA (two months per birth cohort). We use data from the 
Health and Retirement Study (HRS), which provides a rich set of potential explanatory variables 
to study behavioral aspects of retirement. These variables are unique to the HRS and offer the 
opportunity to get closer to explaining behavioral aspects of retirement as well as documenting 
their existence.  
 The main disadvantage of the HRS is the relatively small samples available to study 
retirement and claiming behavior at the FRA. Roughly three quarters of workers retire and claim 
benefits before reaching the FRA, so despite sample sizes of about 1,000 respondents per year of 
birth, the effective sample size is closer to 250 per cohort. This provides about 1,125 
observations on the treated cohorts, and 1,750 for the control cohorts. Therefore, we also use 
data from the Longitudinal Employer-Household Data (LEHD) files. These files are derived 
from administrative state Unemployment Insurance (UI) records, with very large sample sizes. 
These administrative data are used only for descriptive purposes to verify that the trends 
identified in the HRS are robust, since they contain no information on any of the explanatory 
variables of interest. The LEHD is described in Section 4. 
 The HRS is a biennial survey of a sample of households containing individuals over the 
age of 50, and their spouses. The survey began in 1992 with birth cohorts 1931-1941, and new 
cohorts were added in 1998 and 2004. We use the 1992-2008 waves. The analysis sample is birth 
cohorts 1931-1942, since these cohorts had reached their FRA as of 2008, while later cohorts had 
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not. The 1931-37 cohorts are the controls (FRA=65.0) and the 1938-42 cohorts are the treated 
cohorts (FRA>65.0). 
 The HRS records employment status at each interview, and in addition asks for 
information on the start and end dates of all jobs between interviews, to the nearest month. We 
construct a monthly employment history.12 Together with month and year of birth, the 
employment data are used to construct the month and year of labor force exit.13  
 The HRS contains self-reported information on the month and year in which the 
respondent first received a Social Security benefit payment. In some cases, the reported date is 
before the respondent turned 62, indicating that he or she first received some type of Social 
Security benefit other than OASI, such as disability or dependent benefits. In these cases it is not 
possible to identify when the respondent claimed the OASI benefit.14 The month and year of 
OASI claiming is the second outcome of interest. 
 A third outcome of interest is the self-reported month and year of retirement. This 
“subjective” measure is frequently used as an indicator of retirement, and it is of interest to 
determine whether “retirement” and “employment” differ with respect to the FRA. However, 
there are many longitudinally inconsistent self-reports of retirement age, so only about half the 
sample has a self-reported retirement age that is reasonably consistent across waves. 
                                                 
12The initial interview collected information on the start date of the job held at the interview date, 
start and end dates of up to two other jobs before the first interview (longest and last), and the number of 
additional jobs that lasted five or more years. 
13Some people who leave the labor force later return to employment. In such cases there are 
multiple labor force exit dates. As a robustness check, we use labor force exits that are preceded by an 
employment spell of at least 3 months, and followed by at least 3 months out of employment. 
14If an individual reaches his FRA while receiving Social Security Disability Insurance, the 
benefit is switched to OASI, but this is purely an administrative adjustment, so it does not provide any 
information about claiming behavior. Most SSDI recipients never leave the SSDI rolls, and therefore 
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 The monthly record is merged with permanent characteristics such as race, gender, 
ethnicity, and education, and with time-varying measures recorded at the survey dates, including 
health status, the wage rate, job characteristics, household wealth, health insurance, pension 
coverage, and marital status. If there was a change in one of these time-varying variables 
between waves, we assume the change occurred midway between the waves. 
 The HRS contains several variables that are useful in inferring “who is behavioral”. 
These include measures of cognitive ability, risk aversion, self control, and financial planning 
horizon. Cognitive ability measures have been explored by McArdle, Smith and Willis (2009), 
and we follow their approach to construct indicators in three dimensions: Telephone Interview of 
Cognitive Status (TICS), short term memory, and numeracy (see data appendix for details). 
 
4. Impact of the FRA increase 
HRS Results 
 In this section, we describe evidence from the HRS on how the change in the FRA has 
modified the timing of OASI benefit claiming, labor force exit, and self-reported retirement. The 
goal is to test the “behavioral” prediction that the spike at age 65 should shift along with the FRA 
for cohorts born after 1937, against the null hypothesis that the increase in the FRA had only a 
wealth effect.  In the latter case we expect an increase in retirement age, but no substantial shift 
in the spike. 
 We start with graphical evidence on the timing of OASI benefit claiming across cohorts, 
pooling men and women. Figure 2 displays average monthly claiming hazard rates for pre and 
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post-reform cohorts. The claiming hazard rate is defined as the probability of claiming at a given 
age, conditional on not having claimed previously. Age is measured at a bimonthly frequency; 
e.g. age 65 denotes age 65 0/12 to 65 1/1215 . In each graph of figure 1, the dotted line depicts the 
claiming hazard for workers born between 1931 and 1936. As shown by previous studies, there 
is a first spike in the hazard at or just after the early retirement age (62) and a second larger spike 
at the FRA (65).16 About 20% of workers claim at the early retirement age, and 30% of those 
who have not claimed before 65 claim at 65. For each cohort, the vertical lines indicate age 62, 
age 65, and the FRA (if different from age 65). There is clear evidence that the spike in the 
claiming hazard moves in lockstep along with the FRA. The spike at age 65 does not completely 
disappear for the treated cohorts, but it becomes progressively smaller across cohorts. Very 
similar patterns appear when men and women are disaggregated (not shown). These results 
confirm the findings of Song and Manchester (2008), using administrative data. 
  Regression analysis is useful here to summarize the graphical evidence and to 
quantify the impact of the FRA. We adopt the following difference-in-difference specification:  
              iaccaiaciaciac xFRAP εδβγθ ++++=  (4.1) 
where Piac is an indicator variable equal to one if individual i born in cohort c  claims at age a (in 
months), conditional on not having claimed previously. FRA is the indicator variable for age a 
being his FRA, xiac is a set of individual controls, and full sets of cohort and age dummies are 
                                                 
15
 One reason for measuring age at a bimonthly frequency is to make the graph easier to read. It is 
also useful because there is some arbitrariness in measuring the age at which an event occurs. If an 
individual reports leaving his job in April, it is not clear whether to classify his employment status in 
April as employed or not employed, without knowing the exact date.   
16
 The spike at age 62 is slightly after age 62 because benefits are payable beginning in the first 
month in which a person is 62 throughout the whole month, unless the person was born on the 1st or 2nd of 
the month (see Kopczuk and Song, 2008, for discussion). 
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included ( ca δβ , ).The age 65 coefficient (one of the s'β ) captures the part of the spike that is not 
explained by the fact that 65 is the FRA for cohorts up to 1937. The parameter of interest θ  is 
identified by the interaction of age and cohort, under the assumption that the control variables 
capture any non-FRA-related motives to claim at the FRA. Results are shown in table 1. The four 
columns differ by the estimation sample or the controls. Column 1 has no controls other than age 
and cohort effects, and restricts the analysis to ages 64 to 65 11/12. Reaching the FRA increases 
the claiming hazard by 14 percentage points. The effect is statistically highly significant, and 
robust to the inclusion of controls (socioeconomic characteristics, pension and job 
characteristics, measures of cognitive ability, planning horizon and risk aversion) and to changes 
in the estimation sample (columns 2 to 4). Column 4 drops the 1938 cohort since the graphical 
analysis suggests that the effect of the FRA change might have been smaller for that cohort (with 
a higher persistence of the old FRA spike), possibly due to a learning effect. This however makes 
little difference in the estimation. Quantitatively, the estimated impact of the FRA is sizeable: the 
claiming hazard at age 65 is around 30% for cohorts born between 1931 and 1937; more than 
40% (14/30) of the claims occurring at that age for the control cohorts can therefore be explained 
by the fact that 65 is their FRA. 
Equation (4.1) relies on the identifying assumption that any change in the shape of the 
claiming hazard can be attributed to the FRA increase. Other changes over the period may also 
have affected the timing of claiming decisions17. In particular, the Social Security earnings test 
for people who have reached their full retirement age was eliminated in 2000. The rule before 
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 As noted above, the 1983 reform increased the Delayed Retirement Credit (DRC) as well as the 
FRA. An increase in the reward to claiming the benefit after the FRA could affect claiming behavior (and 
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2000 was the following: workers who have not reached the FRA have their earnings reduced by 
$1 for every $2 earned beyond the earnings test threshold; workers who have reached the FRA 
have their benefits reduced by $1 for every $3 earned beyond the earnings test threshold (see 
Manchester and Song, 2008). Although this reduction is compensated by increased benefits at 
older ages (making it more or less neutral in terms of SS wealth), it may be felt as a disincentive 
to claim benefits by those who intend to continue working (Friedberg, 2000; Gruber and Orszag, 
2003; Haider and Loughran, 2008). In 2000, the earnings test was eliminated for workers who 
have reached the FRA. The earnings test was unchanged before the FRA. The introduction of 
this discontinuity may generate a spike in the claiming hazard around the FRA, if some workers 
delay claiming SS benefits until they reach the FRA, in order to avoid the earnings test. 
Fortunately, the cohorts impacted by the increase in the FRA and the removal of the earnings test 
do not fully overlap, making it is possible to separately identify the two effects (see Song and 
Manchester, 2008, for details). It is therefore possible to extend equation (4.1) to separately 
identify the impact of the earnings test removal: 
               iaccaiaciaciaciac xETRFRAP εδβγλθ +++++= , (4.2) 
where iacETR  is an indicator for the month in which the earnings test ceases to apply to 
individual i. The results are given in column (5). The coefficient on the FRA remains unchanged. 
The impact of the earnings test removal is positive and significant, as expected, suggesting that 
part of the age 65 spike for some cohorts was due to the removal of the earnings test. However, 
the impact of reaching the FRA itself is much larger.  
                                                                                                                                                             
does, according to Blau and Goodstein, 2010, and Pingle, 2006). But the DRC is cohort-specific, so its 
effects are absorbed by cohort dummies. 
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 As shown by Coile et al. (2002) and Baker and Benjamin (1999), benefit claiming 
behavior can significantly differ from labor force participation and retirement behavior. Before 
interpreting the shift in the claiming spike from a behavioral perspective, it is therefore important 
to check whether retirement and employment patterns are similar to claiming patterns. Figure 3 
shows that the increase in the FRA resulted in a progressive fall in the age 65 spike in the labor 
force exit hazard. However, there is no systematic evidence of new spikes at the FRA for cohorts 
born after 1937.  
 Columns 1 to 5 in table 2 use the same specifications as table 1. The impact of the FRA is 
smaller than for claiming, but is positive and significantly different from zero. For cohorts born 
before 1937, the monthly hazard of labor force exit at age 65 is about 4.6%. Roughly 20% of this 
spike (0.9/4.6) can be explained by the fact that 65 is the FRA for these cohorts.18  The FRA 
effect is again robust to inclusion of a control for elimination of the earnings test. 
 Figure 4 presents evidence on the monthly hazard of entry to self-reported retirement, 
comparable to figures 2 and 3. The results are in between. There is some reasonably strong 
evidence of a shift in the spike for cohorts born after 1939, consistent with an effect of the FRA 
on retirement decisions. However, the spike at the old FRA (age 65) persists for some of these 
cohorts. The regression results (table 3) are very imprecise. The point estimate implies a smaller 
FRA impact than for claiming and exit from employment. The mean monthly retirement hazard 
for the control cohorts at age 65 is around 13%. 10% of this spike (1.1/13) can be accounted for 
by the fact that 65 is their FRA.  The results are robust to controlling for the elimination of the 
earnings test, but in this case the effect of the earnings test is larger than the effect of the FRA. 
                                                 
18
 Results based on a smaller sample that eliminates temporary withdrawals from the labor force 
(three months or less) gave very similar results. 
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  LEHD results 
In this section, we describe evidence from the LEHD on how the change in the FRA has 
affected the timing of labor force exit. The LEHD Infrastructure File system is based on state 
Unemployment Insurance (UI) administrative files, with data available from 31 states covering 
about 80% of the U.S. work force for the years 1990-2004, although the period covered varies by 
state (Abowd, Haltiwanger, and Lane, 2004). Employers covered by UI file a quarterly report for 
each individual who received any covered earnings in the quarter. UI covers about 96% of 
private non-farm wage-salary employment, with lower coverage of agricultural and government 
workers, and no coverage of the unincorporated self-employed. The UI records contain the 
individual’s Social Security number, and an identification number and quarterly earnings for 
each employer from which he has any covered earnings during the quarter. These data are 
merged by the Census Bureau with the Census Personal Characteristics File, which contains the 
exact date of birth, place of birth, sex, and a measure of race/ethnicity.19 
 The main advantage of the LEHD for our analysis is the very large sample size. The main 
disadvantages are absence of information on hours of work, and lack of data after the third 
quarter of 2004. Without data on hours of work, we must use changes in quarterly earnings to 
infer changes in employment status. The absence of data beyond the third quarter of 2004 means 
                                                 
19An extensive discussion of the construction and the content of these files is provided in Abowd 
et al. (2006). We use a subsample of the full LEHD files, consisting of workers who were employed at 
any employer at which a member of the 1990-2001 panels of the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation (SIPP) worked. This is a very large subsample of the full LEHD, somewhat skewed toward 
large firms. See Blau and Shvydko (in press) for a description of the subsample. In order to reduce the 
number of quarterly observations from the hundreds of millions to the more manageable level of several 
  
19 
that only two of the “treated” birth cohorts (1938 and 1939) can be used to analyze changes in 
labor force behavior around age 65..   
The main outcome of interest is a binary indicator of zero earnings in a given quarter, 
conditional on positive earnings in the previous quarter, which we interpret as the hazard of labor 
force exit. We aggregate the data into cells defined by month and year of birth (January 1931 
through December 1942), calendar quarter (1994:Q1 through 2004:Q3, although not all quarters 
are represented for all cohorts), and age in quarters (62.0, 62.25, 62.5,..., 66.0), and conduct the 
analysis using cell means, with no loss of information. Data are available for 2,400 cells, with 
roughly 1,000 individual observations per cell on average. Men and women are pooled and 
gender and state dummies (fractions, after aggregation) are included in the regression models. 
The specification used in column 1 of table 4 is the same as in tables 2-4. Age and birth 
year dummies are included, so that the effect of the FRA variable is identified from the 
interaction of age and birth cohort.20 The results are consistent with reference dependence, with a 
positive FRA effect on the exit hazard, significantly different from zero. Given the fact that the 
data only has two post-reform cohorts, we check a new specification in column 2. The FRA 
indicator is interacted with cohort dummies: so, the coefficient on the FRA*(coh=1938) variable 
can be interpreted as the average impact of the FRA for cohort 1938, compared to individuals of 
the same age in the 1931-37 cohorts, and accounting for cohort trends. The results are 
                                                                                                                                                             
million, we use data from only three states. Census Bureau guidelines prevent us from identifying the 
three states. 
20
 If a worker leaves employment at his FRA, his earnings will be positive in the quarter in which 
his FRA falls (unless he quits on the first day of the quarter), so zero earnings in the first calendar quarter 
after the quarter in which he reaches his FRA is the only reliable measure of exit at the FRA. Depending 
on birth month within a quarter, some cases do not provide any evidence on the impact of the change in 
the FRA. A more detailed discussion of which cases contribute to identification is available from the 
authors. 
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unexpected for the 1938 cohort: reaching the FRA decreases the hazard of exit. The effect for 
cohort 1939 is small and statistically insignificant. The specification in column 2 has the 
advantage of being less restrictive than in column 1, as it does not force the magnitude of the 
FRA effects to be the same for all cohorts, but it also uses less information: in column 1, the 
spike at the FRA observed in the 1931-37 cohorts and its decline afterwards contribute to the 
identification of the FRA coefficient, whereas the estimate in column 2 only tests for the 
emergence of spikes at the new FRAs.21 
 
Summary 
 Overall, combining the information on labor force transitions from the LEHD and the 
HRS as well as from self-reported retirement age from the HRS provides only mixed evidence 
that the labor supply decisions of workers have been affected by the change in the FRA in a 
manner consistent with a behavioral interpretation. Limited statistical power and measurement 
error are issues with each of these data sources. However, their combination gives us some 
confidence that labor supply decisions are affected, but only in a limited way. 
An important question is whether the magnitudes of the changes in claiming, labor force, 
and retirement behavior could be explained solely by wealth effects as a response to the benefit 
cut implied by the increase in the FRA.  We cannot directly address this question because we do 
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 We constructed graphs like those in Figures 2-4 and estimated models with non-parametric 
specifications (like those in Mastrobuoni, but for hazards rather than levels). The results were similar to 
the HRS results in Figure 3, showing clear evidence of a decline in the hazard at 65, but less clear 
evidence of increases at other ages. We omit these results for brevity, but they are available on request. 
We also analyzed exit from employment in the HRS data using the same cohorts as in the LEHD data and 
interacting the FRA indicator with indicators for the 1938 and 1939 cohorts; estimates of the FRA impact 
go in the same direction: 0.5 (0.5) when pooling all sources of identification like in column 1 of table 4; 
-0.9 (0.8) and 1.6 (1.2) for the FRA indicator interacted with birth cohorts 1938 and 1939, respectively. 
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not estimate the wealth effect; rather, as in Mastrobuoni (2009), we estimate the total effect, 
including the wealth effect and any “behavioral” effects. Several papers report estimates of the 
elasticity of the hazard of labor force exit with respect to Social Security Wealth (SSW): (1) 
Coile and Gruber (2007): the largest effects they find are 0.16 when evaluated at mean SSW, and 
.075 when evaluated at median SSW. (2) Samwick (1998): approximately zero. (3) Day, Mullen, 
and Wagner (2009) using Austrian administrative data: 0.40. The change in SSW wealth implied 
by a change in the FRA from 65 to 66 is 6.67%. If we take the largest elasticity estimate, 0.4, this 
would imply a 2.7% (not percentage point) decrease in the hazard of LF exit. Using the largest 
estimate from Coile and Gruber, 0.16, implies a 1.07% decline in the hazard. These numbers 
cannot be compared directly to the results reported in Figures 2-4, but the visual impression from 
these figures is of effects much larger than 1-3%. 
 
 5. Who is behavioral? 
 Results from section 4 provide strong evidence that OASI benefit claiming behavior has 
followed the increase in the FRA, and weaker evidence that the same is true of labor force 
participation. As argued in section 2, this finding leaves behavioral factors as likely explanations. 
Three leading candidates are reference dependence with loss aversion, “advice” from the SS 
administration, and “social norms”. An indirect way to discriminate between alternative 
behavioral explanations is to ask a simpler, descriptive question: which types of workers respond 
most strongly to the FRA shift? This is interesting per se – indeed, the recent retirement literature 
has stressed the fact that aggregate retirement behavior may hide considerable heterogeneity (e.g. 
                                                                                                                                                             
This contrasts with the claiming results, where the FRA impact is positive (and significant) in all 
specifications, as can be expected from figure 2. 
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see the discussions by Burtless, 2004; Liebman et al., 2008; and the empirical applications in 
Coile et al., 2002, and Chan and Stevens, 2008). It may also shed light on the most likely 
behavioral mechanism. For instance, if workers with lower cognitive skills respond more to the 
FRA, this would point toward non-standard decision making (bounded rationality, for instance), 
making an “advice” or social norm explanation plausible.  
 A simple way to look at this question is to compare the FRA impacts across 
subpopulations. The corresponding regression model is: 
iaciacciacacaiaciaciaciac TypeTypeTypeFRAFRAP εζγδβθθ +×+×+++×+= 111121 , (5.1) 
 
where Type is an indicator variable that splits the population in two (for instance, Type is 1 for 
individuals with higher numeracy, 0 otherwise). The estimate of 2θ  reveals whether there is a 
different response to the FRA in the population characterized by the Type variable. The type 
variable is also interacted with cohort and age dummies. 
 Table 5 displays estimates for OASI benefit claiming, using the HRS data. 18 
stratification dimensions are considered separately; they can be grouped into 3 broad categories: 
socioeconomic; pension and job characteristics; and cognition and behavior. The parameter of 
interest 2θ  is reported as the coefficient on the “FRA*interaction term” line. White workers tend 
to respond more than non-whites (+8 percentage points), although the difference is not 
statistically significant. Differences in the impact of the FRA along other socioeconomic 
dimensions – sex, marital status, education, and health – are small and/or statistically 
insignificant. In the second panel, the type of pension and the level of wealth appear to matter: 
the FRA impact is significantly lower among workers whose current job provides a defined 
benefit pension and significantly higher among workers holding above median wealth. Measures 
  
23 
of cognitive ability shown in the last panel matter too: having a high TICS score increases the 
response to the FRA by 9.6 pp; better memory and higher numeracy scores increase it by 5.7 pp 
(not statistically significant) and 12.2 pp., respectively. Overall, this suggests that wealthier and 
more cognitively skilled workers are “more behavioral” in the sense of following the FRA more 
closely. This seems to go against a bounded rationality explanation whereby workers with lower 
cognitive skills would follow the FRA as a default solution, or consider it as advice from the 
SSA. It therefore tends to point in the direction of non-standard preferences – like reference 
dependence and loss aversion – even though this still begs the question of why workers with 
higher cognitive skills would more strongly display such non-standard preferences.22 The impact 
of defined benefit pension coverage could reflect the fact that these pension plans maintain a 
normal age of 65, reducing the salience of the change in the FRA.  
 A limitation of model (5.1) is that it does not allow us to determine which of the many 
interaction effects reported separately in table 5 are the most important. Interacting all 18 
characteristics with the FRA indicator, the set of cohort dummies and the set of age dummies is 
not feasible due to limited sample size and multicollinearity. A more parsimonious specification 
introduces interactions with the most promising dimensions of heterogeneity, based on table 5: 
pension characteristics, wealth, cognitive measures, and the basic socioeconomic variables. The 
various specifications are given in table 6. Multicollinearity pushes the standard errors up, so that 
few interaction terms remain significant. In column 1, where nine dimensions of heterogeneous 
impact are considered simultaneously, the only significant effects are due to holding a defined 
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 Benjamin, Brown, and Shapiro (2006) find that small-stakes risk aversion and short run 
discounting are less common among those with higher cognitive ability. These findings might conflict 
with our results, to the extent that non-standard preferences share a common component across domains. 
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benefit pension, and to high memory. The wealth effect shrinks somewhat, suggesting that it was 
picking up in part the effect of cognitive ability. Combining the cognitive measures into a single 
index confirms the positive impact of cognitive skills (column 2).23 Dropping the DB variable 
(only available for a subsample of workers) does not significantly alter the results (column 3).  
Of course, it may still be the case that these interaction effects are driven by unobserved 
sources of heterogeneity. However, as noted above, a plausible causal interpretation of the DB 
interaction effect is that the presence of a DB pension reduces the salience of the SS FRA, in 
particular when the DB pension plan maintains a normal retirement age at 65. Accordingly, when 
we restrict the sample to DB holders we find that the responsiveness to the SS FRA is lower for 
those with a DB plan that has a normal retirement age at 65.24 By contrast, the negative impact of 
low cognitive skills may seem harder to interpret causally. We first check that it is not capturing 
the impact of stressful or otherwise demanding job characteristics (column 4), and that it is not 
due to a lower sensitivity to the removal of the SS earnings test (column 5).25 Checking for non 
linear effects, we find that most of the cognition effect is due to the lowest quartile, with smaller 
differences among the upper three quartiles (column 6). Furthermore, the effect is weaker for 
cohorts 1940+ compared to 1938-39 (column 7). This can be traced to the persistence of a large 
age-65 spike for people with lower cognitive skills. As show by figure 5 (replicating figure 2 by 
cognitive skill group), the age profiles of the hazard rate of claiming are very similar for people 
with higher and lower cognitive skills born in 1937. Spikes at the new FRAs appear for cohorts 
                                                                                                                                                             
Their paper does not analyze reference dependence. Also, we do not find significant differences by levels 
of risk aversion. 
23
 See the Appendix for details on the cognition index. 
24
 The coefficient on FRA*(DB NRA=65) is -.095 (marginally significant with a standard error 
of.059). 
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born after 1938, but, for people with lower cognitive skills, the spike at the FRA is somewhat 
smaller and the spike at age 65 persists. This suggests that people with lower cognitive skills 
may be slower to learn about the change in the FRA and adapt it into their decision making. 
Instead, they may use workers from earlier cohorts as a reference.26 27 
 
 6. Implications of the results for framing Social Security reform 
We interpret the empirical results presented above as suggesting that reference 
dependence is a factor in claiming and retirement decisions. In this section, we introduce 
reference dependence in a lifetime labor supply model in order to draw out its implications for 
framing of Social Security reforms. Specifically, we derive conditions under which reference 
dependence leads to a greater increase in employment in response to a benefit cut than would be 
predicted by the wealth effect alone.  The model echoes the way the SS administration frames 
the retirement decision, as a tradeoff between income and “years to enjoy it”. 
The set up is as simple as possible. Workers choose their optimal retirement and claiming 
age (assumed to be the same for simplicity),28 by trading off years of leisure l against lifetime 
consumption c. The age at death (T) is fixed and known, so  choosing retirement age R is 
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 Note that there is no significant difference across the two cognitive groups in the response to 
the removal of the SS earnings test. 
26
 This section has focused on claiming behavior, for which there is strong and robust evidence of 
responsiveness to the FRA. Analysis of employment exit and self-reported retirement indicates that there 
is little heterogeneity that can be detected in the FRA effect on these outcomes (results available from the 
authors). 
27
 Other explanations are possible. One would be that the two groups take the FRA as the 
claiming age recommended by the SSA, but only workers with higher cognitive skills read their 
statements and learn about the new FRA. We consider this explanation as less plausible given the care 
taken by the SSA not to imply any advice in their phrasing of the leisure / consumption tradeoff.  
28
 This assumption implies that we ignore the lower bound on claiming age. In the simulations 
described below, we account for it. 
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equivalent to choosing lifetime leisure: RTl −= (for convenience, we assume life begins at 
labor force entry). The budget constraint is: wRkc += , where wRk +  is a linear approximation 
(in the vicinity of the FRA) of the lifetime income derived from retiring at age R; k (initial 
wealth) and w (annual compensation, including the wage and the increment to the Social 
Security benefit resulting from an additional year of work) are fixed parameters in this 
approximation. This yields the standard static labor supply model, interpreted as a model of 
lifetime labor supply: 
).(..
),(max
,
lTwkcts
clUlc
−+=
 (6.1) 
The SS rules and statements suggest a specific age, the FRA, as a reference. Let cFRA and 
lFRA denote the levels of consumption and leisure from retiring and claiming at the FRA. Workers 
may experience loss aversion with respect to either leisure or consumption or both: they may be 
reluctant to reduce the number of “years to enjoy retirement” below the number implied by 
retiring at their FRA, and they may be reluctant to consume less than the level implied by retiring 
at the FRA. Following Tversky and Kahneman (1991), we incorporate reference dependence in a 
two-good model with no uncertainty by specifying the payoff from choice (c,l) as: 
),()(),( 21 cRlaRclU FRA +=  (6.2) 
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1λ  and 2λ  are the coefficients of loss aversion, with 1, 21 >λλ  if there is loss aversion, and 
121 == λλ  otherwise. u(.) and v(.) are increasing and concave utility subfunctions. Lastly, 
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0>a is an individual-specific parameter that allows for heterogeneity in the preference for 
leisure.29  
This specification captures an asymmetry in preferences with regard to losses and gains 
around the FRA reference. Starting from the reference set by the FRA, the marginal utility of 
increasing consumption by one dollar is )(' FRAcv  whereas the utility loss from decreasing 
consumption by one dollar is )('2 FRAcvλ . Similarly, increasing leisure time by one day increases 
utility by )(' FRAlau , whereas reducing it by one day decreases utility by )('1 FRAluaλ . Both 
dimensions of loss aversion increase the likelihood that the FRA is the optimal retirement age. 
It is straightforward to show that the solution to problem 6.1 can be characterized by two critical 
values of a: individuals with low preference for leisure ( )('
)('
1 FRA
FRA
lu
cvw
a λ< ) retire after the full 
retirement age; those with high preference for leisure ( )('
)('
2
FRA
FRA
lu
cv
wa λ> ) retire before the full 
retirement age; and workers with intermediate preferences for leisure 
( 





∈ )('
)('
;)('
)('
2
1 FRA
FRA
FRA
FRA
lu
cv
w
lu
cvw
a λλ ) retire exactly at the FRA. These three cases are illustrated in 
figure 6, which plots UFRA as a function of l, after substituting for consumption from the budget 
constraint. UFRA has a kink at lFRA. This kink generates a mass point at the FRA in the distribution 
of retirement ages. Let F denote the c.d.f. of a, and PFRA denote the fraction of workers retiring at 
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 We introduce a as the only source of heterogeneity, and derive the distribution of retirement 
ages from the distribution of a. One could introduce other sources of heterogeneity, either in preferences – 
1λ , 2λ , u(.) and v(.) may vary across individuals – or in budget constraints – variations in k, w or T. 
However, these other sources of heterogeneity have similar implications for the retirement age 
distribution: as long as they are continuously distributed (so that they do not generate a kink in 
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the FRA. Then: 
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The fact that PFRA is strictly positive if 11 >λ  or 12 >λ  shows that loss aversion in either of the 
two dimensions (loss of leisure or loss of benefits) is enough to generate the spike. However, 
these two dimensions have opposite impacts on the rest of the retirement age distribution. 
Starting from a situation without loss aversion ( 121 == λλ ), an increase in 1λ  attracts workers 
who would otherwise work longer toward the FRA, thus reducing the average retirement age 
(see the model appendix for details). By contrast, an increase in 2λ  attracts workers who would 
otherwise retire earlier toward the FRA, thus increasing the average retirement age. Overall, the 
impact of reference dependence and loss aversion on the average retirement age is ambiguous a 
priori. 
 
Impact of the 1983 reform 
The 1983 reform, as framed by the SSA, can easily be incorporated into the model as a 
change in the reference age. In order to maintain the same level of benefits, workers born after 
1937 must delay retirement by (FRA - 65 years). For instance, in order to receive 100% of the 
primary insurance amount, workers born in 1937 must claim at age 65, whereas workers born in 
1943 must delay claiming until age 66. In the model’s notation, the reform is such that 0=∆ FRAc  
and 0<∆ FRAl . All other things equal, this has two effects on the retirement age distribution: 
First, the spike in the retirement hazard shifts to the new FRA. Second, the probability of retiring 
                                                                                                                                                             
preferences or the budget constraints), they cannot by themselves account for a spike in the retirement 
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before the FRA increases, whereas the probability of retiring after the FRA decreases. The 
combined effect is an increase in the average retirement age. We now ask whether a different 
framing of the reform would have yielded different results. Specifically, how does dkRdE /)( , 
the response of the average retirement age R to a given shift in the intercept of the benefit 
schedule dk, vary with the way the reform is framed? In all cases, we have 
∫−=−= daafalTlETRE )()()()( * , (6.4) 
where f is the density of a, and )(* al  is the level of leisure chosen by a worker given his 
preference for leisure. The quantity we are interested in is  
∫−= daafdk
adl
dk
RdE )()()(
*
. (7.5) 
The first framing option we consider is neutral: your benefit schedule is lower than the 
schedule of your older peers, without reference to a specific age (see Figure 1). In this case the 
response of )(* al  to the reform is simply given by differentiating the standard first order 
conditions for an interior solution, yielding the standard wealth effect (see the model 
appendix).30 
 Under the other two framing options, a reference point is explicitly given so that the 
utility of a worker with preference for leisure a is described by equations 6.2 above, and  
the optimal retirement age is characterized by solving the first order conditions for the cases in 
which )('
)('
1 FRA
FRA
lu
cvw
a λ<  and )('
)('
2
FRA
FRA
lu
cv
wa λ> ), and by setting l = lFRA if 
                                                                                                                                                             
hazard. 
30
 This only holds if there was no loss aversion and framing before the reform. Otherwise, it is 
unclear how a neutral framing of the reform would be perceived: would it cancel the initial reference? If 
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a λλ . The two framing options differ by the fact that only the third 
framing option implies a change in the reference point. 
 In the second framing option, workers have the same reference point after the reform 
( FRAl ). However, SSA tells them that there is a cut in benefits for claiming at the FRA. In other 
words, they still perceive that they meet a target if they retire at 65 after the reform, but the target 
is now lower. This arises if the reform is framed as a change in the PIA (the benefit amount 
available if claimed at the FRA) with no change in the FRA. 
 Finally, the third framing option is the one actually mandated by the reform: a change in 
the FRA with no mention of a benefit cut. In this case, things remain as in the 2nd framing option 
for workers with low and high preference for leisure. Things do however differ for workers with 
intermediate preferences for leisure. The condition for claiming at the FRA is the same as under 
the second framing option. However, the FRA itself changes, with .1 dk
w
dlFRA =    
The model appendix shows that 
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, where the subscript indicates the 
framing option. In the presence of reference dependence, the reform has a stronger impact if it is 
framed as a change in the reference point than if it is framed as an equivalent change in the 
benefit at the reference point. The comparison with 
1
)(
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

dk
RdE
 (neutral framing) is less 
immediate; it depends on the parameters. However, empirical estimates suggest that 
                                                                                                                                                             
not, and if workers keep the initial reference point, the first framing option would be equivalent to the 
second option, described below. 
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. Indeed, Mastrobuoni (2009) finds that the average response to a 1 year 
increase in the FRA (under the 3rd framing option, which is how it was framed by SSA) is a .5 
year increase in the average retirement age. For workers at the FRA, loss aversion implies a 1 for 
1 response. In this model, the .5 response must be a weighted average of 1 for people at the FRA 
and δ  (the average response for people above and below the FRA). This implies that 1<δ . 
More precisely, the magnifying effect under the 3rd framing option is positively correlated with 
the share of the population clustered at the FRA. Assuming that the response is roughly constant 
for other workers, we have indeed 
[ ] [ ])1((1)1(1)(
3
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In sum, compared to a situation without a reference point (PFRA = 0), reference 
dependence magnifies the impact of a reform if the reform is expressed as a change in the 
reference point. This magnifying effect increases with the share of the population initially 
clustered at the reference point. Figure 7 summarizes the main lesson of the model using 
simulated data. We use CRRA specifications for u and v and assume that leisure preference a 
follows a log-normal distribution with mean 1. We set w=1 and k=0, and simulate the model for 
various values of the risk aversion coefficients in u and v and the variance of the log-normal 
distribution. We select only those simulations that yield plausible distributions of the retirement 
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 In our simulations discussed below, 
1
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2
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
dk
RdE
 are roughly similar. 
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age.32 We then take averages across the corresponding simulations.33 The graphs show the 
simulated impact of loss aversion (x-axis) on (i) the average retirement age before the reform 
(top row); (ii) the share of workers retiring exactly at the FRA before the reform (middle row); 
and (iii) the impact of the reform on the average retirement age (bottom row). The latter impact 
is analyzed under two framing options: the reform is framed as an increase in the FRA (dark full 
line, “framing option number 3”) or the reform is framed as a cut in the PIA (dashed grey lines, 
“framing option number 2”). The first framing option (neutral framing) corresponds to the point with 
121 == λλ  on the x-axis. At that point, there is no loss aversion, and framing does not matter 
(assuming, as discussed above, that there was no framing effect before the reform: even though workers 
would display loss aversion if there was a reference, when no reference is given everything happens as if 
people were not loss averse). The three columns correspond to different assumptions on loss 
aversion: in column 1, workers suffer only from loss aversion with regard to leisure time below 
their reference; in column 2, workers suffer only from loss aversion with regard to benefits 
below their reference; in columns 3, the two types of loss aversion are combined.  
Looking at the first row illustrates the fact that the impact of loss aversion on the average 
retirement age is, in general, indeterminate. As noted above, aversion with regard to loss of 
leisure reduces the average retirement age (top graph on the left), but aversion with regard to loss 
of benefits increases it (middle graph on the top). The combined effect is, in general, almost 0 
(top graph on the right). By contrast, the two types of loss aversion both cause an increase in the 
size of the spike at the FRA (middle row). Finally, the bottom row shows the crucial role played 
                                                 
32
 Specifically, we drop simulations with sets of parameters that lead to less than 72% of workers 
retiring before the FRA, and more than 20% retiring after the FRA, in the absence of loss aversion 
( 121 == λλ ).  
33
 Results using each set of parameters individually are very similar. 
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by framing in the presence of loss aversion. In the absence of framing effects (which corresponds 
to 121 == λλ ), the reform – modeled here as a 1-year increase in the FRA or a 6.7% benefit cut 
(as in the 1983 reform) – increases the average retirement age by less than one month (this is 
represented by the point 121 == λλ  on the horizontal axis in the bottom three graphs). In the 
presence of strong loss aversion, framing the reform as an increase in the FRA strongly 
magnifies the impact, to about 4 months if 321 == λλ  (bottom right graph, solid line). By 
contrast, the impact of the reform is about the same as in the no-loss-aversion case if the reform 
is framed as a cut in the PIA (bottom right graph, dashed line). The loss aversion parameters 1λ  
and 2λ  have strong implications for the impact of the SS reform on retirement age. Even though 
they are hard to estimate, the simulations suggest that the amplifying effect is roughly 
proportional to the share of workers clustered at the FRA. This motivated our empirical attempt 
above at quantifying the magnitude of the spike at the FRA.  
 Is loss aversion enough to explain the unexpectedly strong impact of the 1983 reform 
(Mastrobuoni, 2009)? Our analysis suggests that reference dependence matters, by shifting the 
workers clustered at the old reference point toward the new reference point. However, as noted 
above, the share of workers who have not retired or claimed benefits by the age of 65 is small, so 
the impact on the average retirement age remains modest.34 Moreover, Mastrobuoni’s results 
show that the 1983 reform also strongly affected the retirement distribution at ages 62 to 64, 
suggesting that while loss aversion has probably magnified the impact of the reform, it may not 
fully explain the large effect of the reform. 
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 For instance, if 10% of workers initially retired at their FRA, the amplifying effect due to these 
workers would be less than .1 years (10% of workers postponing retirement by 1 year).  
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 7. Conclusion 
This paper has used the 1983 Social Security reform as a quasi-experiment to provide 
evidence on framing effects in retirement behavior. From a methodological perspective, the FRA 
is particularly well-suited to study reference dependence: by contrast with other applications of 
reference dependence to labor supply analysis, the reference is explicitly defined and then 
exogenously modified by the 1983 reform. The FRA impact is unambiguously identified by 
cohort discontinuities. Although one cannot fully rule out alternative behavioral explanations 
such as social norms or reliance on SSA “advice”, the latter explanations seem at odds with the 
fact that workers with higher cognitive ability respond more to the FRA change. Responsiveness 
to the FRA does not seem to be due to unsophisticated decision making. 
Framing effects have been well documented in the related domain of pension plan choice. 
Our results indicate that they exist in benefit claiming and retirement as well. Given that around 
3 workers out of 4 have already claimed SS benefits before the FRA, the aggregate impact of 
loss aversion in the context of the 1983 reform remains modest. However, the mechanisms at 
play are quite general and have potentially important implications for framing of future reforms, 
in the same way as findings on savings and pension plan decisions have led to “behavioral 
institutional design” recommendations (see, e.g., Benartzi and Thaler, 2004). Indeed, as shown 
by a simple extension of the standard labor supply model, framing provides the decision maker 
with a potentially powerful and almost costless tool to influence aggregate labor supply: framing 
a reform as a change in the reference point magnifies the impact, whereas framing it as a benefit 
cut dampens the response. How to use this knowledge depends on the goals of reform, and this 
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suggests an important avenue for research: how should policy makers take into account loss 
aversion in designing future reforms? 
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Data appendix 
 
 The main features of the data are described in section 4. This appendix describes in more 
detail the variables used to differentiate cognitive and behavioral types. Most variables are 
derived from the raw HRS files. 
 
Cognitive variables: 
 
High TICS score. The TICS variable provides an objective measure of the respondent’s memory 
and ability to think quickly. This is the sum of points (1 for each correct answer) for a set of 
questions the respondent has answered; it ranges from 0 to 10. The variable was only collected in 
waves 3-8 of the HRS. We use a dummy for high TICS scores (above 9). 
 
High episodic memory. As part of the interview the interviewer asks the respondent to listen and 
then recall a list of words. This variable indicates how many words the respondent can recall 
immediately after hearing them. In waves 1 and 2, the list included 20 words. In subsequent 
waves, the list included 10 words. The score for waves 1 and 2 was divided by 2 for 
comparability. A second variable indicates how many words the respondent can recall some time 
after hearing the list, i.e, after answering a few other questions. We average the two scores. We 
then use a dummy for high memory:  a score higher than 5 out of 10. 
 
High numeracy. The numeracy variable is the number of correct answers to the following three 
questions: Correctly answer the question “If 5 people all have the winning numbers in the lottery 
and the prize is two million dollars, how much will each of them get?”; “If the chance of getting 
a disease is 10 percent, how many people out of 1,000 would be expected to get the disease?”; 
“Let's say you have $200 in a savings account. The account earns 10 percent interest per year. 
How much would you have in the account at the end of two years?”. These questions were only 
asked during waves 6 to 8 of the HRS. We generate an indicator variable for high numeracy, 
indicating at least two correct answers out of three. 
 
We construct a cognitive index equal to a weighted sum of the TICS, memory and numeracy 
scores (putting a weight 3.3 times as large on numeracy, to compensate for the smaller range of 
values). The index can go from 0 to 30. 
 
Behavioral variables 
 
High self control. We create a self-control score using a series of 5 questions such as “I feel that I 
can do as I please. (Often? Sometimes? Not often? Never?).” The maximum score is 19, and we 
generate an indicator for high self control that equals 1 for people with a score higher than 6. 
 
The next two variables come from the RAND release of the HRS:  
Long financial planning horizon. The “long financial planning horizon” dummy is equal to 1 for 
those who respond to plan at least for the next few years. 
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Risk averse. The “risk averse” dummy is equal to 1 for workers classified as the most risk averse 
(out of four categories). 
 
Working condition variables 
 
These are from the following questions: “I'll read some statements that are true for some people's 
jobs but not for other people's jobs. Thinking of your job, please tell how often these statements 
are true.” 
• My job requires lifting heavy loads. 
• My job requires lots of physical effort. 
• My job requires stooping, kneeling, or crouching. 
• My job requires good eyesight. 
• My job involves a lot of stress. 
 
Stressful job is an indicator variable for responding “all or almost all of the time” or “most of the 
time” to the last item. 
 
Physically demanding job is an indicator variable for being in the top half of the sample for a 
synthetic variable summing answers to the first three items.  
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Model Appendix 
 
Here we show the results stated in section 6.  
Starting from a situation without loss aversion ( 121 == λλ ), an increase in 1λ  attracts 
workers who would otherwise work longer toward the FRA, thus reducing the average retirement 
age: 0/ 1 =− λddPFRA , 0/ 1 >λddPFRA  and 0/ 1 <+ λddPFRA . An increase in 2λ  attracts workers 
who would otherwise retire earlier toward the FRA, thus increasing the average retirement age: 
0/ 2 <− λddPFRA , 0/ 2 >λddPFRA  and 0/ 2 =+ λddPFRA . 
Impact of the 1983 reform: the probability of retiring before the FRA (
−FRAP ) increases, 
whereas the probability of retiring after the FRA ( +FRAP ) decreases. This can be directly seen 
from  
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 Under framing options 2 and 3 the optimal retirement age is   
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the probability that [ ]aaa ;'∈  or [ ]aaa ;'∈  is 0, so that we can neglect these marginal workers 
when computing the impact of the reform on the expected retirement age. We are left with three 
categories of workers. Those with low preference for leisure respond to the benefit cut 
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 In the third framing option, workers with low and high preference for leisure respond as 
in the second option, but workers with intermediate preferences for leisure also respond. The 
condition for claiming at the FRA is the same as under the second framing option: 
[ ]';' aaa ∈
. 
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However, the FRA itself changes, with .1 dk
w
dlFRA =  Consequently, these workers delay 
claiming by .1 dk
w
 The impact of the reform on the mean retirement age in this case is  
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Appendix: SSA 55+ Insert. 
 
  
45 
 
  
46 
Figure 1: Relationship between Social Security Benefit Claiming Age and Benefit level as a 
percent of the Primary Insurance Amount for Two Birth Cohorts 
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Source: Authors’ calculation from Social Security rules.
  
47 
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
740 750 760 770 780 790
Age (in months)
1937 cohort
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
740 750 760 770 780 790
Age (in months)
1938 cohort
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
740 750 760 770 780 790
Age (in months)
1939 cohort
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
740 750 760 770 780 790
Age (in months)
1940 cohort
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
740 750 760 770 780 790
Age (in months)
1941 cohort
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
740 750 760 770 780 790
Age (in months)
1942 cohort
Figure 2: SS Benefit Claiming Hazard
 
Notes: The graphs show the average monthly claiming hazard rates for pre and post-reform cohorts. The 
claiming hazard rate is defined as the probability of claiming at a given age, conditional on not having 
claimed previously. Age is measured at a bimonthly frequency; e.g. age 65 denotes age 65 0/12 to 
65 1/12. In each graph, the dotted line depicts the claiming hazard for workers born between 1931 and 
1936. For each cohort, the vertical lines indicate age 62, age 65, and the FRA (if different from age 65). 
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Figure 3: Hazard of Exit from Employment
 
 
Notes: see notes to figure 2. 
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Figure 4: Hazard of Retirement
 
Notes: see notes to figure 2. To keep the same scale on the vertical axis for 1942 as for other 
birth cohorts, the hazard rate at age 790 (65 10/12) has been arbitrarily set at .2. The observed 
value is .6 (over only 5 individuals). 
  
51 
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
740 750 760 770 780 790
Age (in months)
1937 cohort
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
740 750 760 770 780 790
Age (in months)
1938 cohort
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
740 750 760 770 780 790
Age (in months)
1939 cohort
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
740 750 760 770 780 790
Age (in months)
1940 cohort
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
740 750 760 770 780 790
Age (in months)
1941 cohort
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
740 750 760 770 780 790
Age (in months)
1942 cohort
Workers with higher vs. lower cognitive skills
Figure 5: SS Benefit Claiming Hazard
 
Notes: see notes to figure 2. People with a cognitive index above the median are in black dashed 
lines, people with a cognitive index below the median are in gray full lines. 
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Figure 6: Heterogeneous preference for leisure 
and optimal retirement age 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: see discussion in the text. 
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Figure 7: Simulated Effects of Framing with Different Degrees of Loss Aversion 
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Note: The graphs show the simulated impact of loss aversion (x-axis) on (i) the average retirement age before the 1983 reform 
(top row); (ii) the share of workers retiring exactly at the FRA before the 1983 reform (middle row); (iii) the impact of 1983 
reform on the average retirement age (bottom row). The latter impact is analyzed under two framing options: the reform is 
framed as an increase in the FRA (dark full line) or the reform is framed as a cut of the PIA (dashed grey lines).  
The three columns correspond to different assumptions on loss aversion: in column 1, values above 1 on the x-axis ( 11 >λ ) 
mean that workers suffer only from aversion with regard to cuts in leisure time below their reference; in column 2, values above 
1 on the x-axis ( 12 >λ ) mean that workers suffer only from aversion with regard to cuts in benefits below their reference; in 
columns 3, the two types of loss aversion are combined. In all graphs, 1 on the x-axis ( 121 == λλ ) is the case with no loss 
aversion. The slope of the curves in each graph shows the impact of increasing loss aversion.  
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Table 1: Impact of the FRA on OASI Benefit Claiming Hazard 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FRA 13.8*** 13.6*** 13.3*** 13.7*** 13.6***
(1.9) (1.9) (1.9) (2.1) (1.9)
SS earnings test removal 3.2***
(1.0)
Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohorts 1932-41 1932-41 1932-41 1932-37; 1939-41 1932-41
Age range 64-66 64-66 62-66 64-66 64-66
N 25801 25801 89348 23570 25801
R² 0.146 0.154 0.162 0.152 0.155
Claiming social security (OASI) benefits
 
Notes: FRA is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the current month is the FRA and zero otherwise. The coefficients measure the 
percentage point increase in the SS benefit claiming monthly hazard at the FRA. 
See equation (4.1) for the specification. The dependent variable is a monthly dummy for claiming social benefits. The models 
were estimated by OLS with standard errors clustered by individuals. Each regression includes a full set of monthly age dummies 
and birth cohort dummies. Controls in columns (2)-(5): measures of cognitive capability, planning horizon, risk aversion, pension 
and job characteristics, health and socio-demographic characteristics.  
Sample: HRS waves 1992-2008. Age range and birth cohorts included in the regression differ by column. *, **, and *** indicate 
that the coefficient estimate is significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Impact of the FRA on the Hazard of Exit from Employment 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FRA 1.0*** 0.9** 0.9** 1.3*** 1.0***
(0.4) (0.4) (0.4) (0.4) (0.4)
SS earnings test removal 0.5*
(0.3)
Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohorts 1932-41 1932-41 1932-41 1932-37; 1939-41 1932-41
Age range 64-66 64-66 62-66 64-66 64-66
N 68952 68952 152753 62662 68952
R² 0.016 0.047 0.054 0.047 0.047
Exit from Employment
 
 Notes: see notes to Table 1.  
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Table 3: Impact of the FRA on the Hazard of Retirement 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FRA 1.5 1.1 1.1 1.8 1.1
(1.6) (1.6) (1.6) (2.0) (1.6)
SS earnings test removal 2.2**
(1.1)
Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohorts 1932-41 1932-41 1932-41 1932-37; 1939-41 1932-41
Age range 64-66 64-66 62-66 64-66 64-66
N 16387 16387 46737 14801 16387
R² 0.056 0.082 0.085 0.083 0.083
Retiring
 
Notes: see notes to Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Impact of the FRA on the Hazard of Exit from Employment (LEHD data) 
 
(1) (2)
FRA*(coh=1938) -2.8***
(0.7)
FRA*(coh=1939) -0.1
(1.6)
FRA 1.2**
(0.5)
Cohorts 1931-42 1931-42
Age range 62-66 62-66
N 2256 2256
R² 0.97 0.97
Exit from Employment 
 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy for the first quarter with 0 earnings, interpreted as exit from employment. Data are 
means over cells defined by  the month of birth, observed in a given quarter. Each regression includes a full set of monthly age 
dummies and birth cohort dummies. Controls: gender and state dummies (fraction, after aggregation). *, **, and *** indicate that 
the coefficient estimate is significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
Sample: LEHD from three states. 
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Table 5: Differential impact of FRA on SS Benefit Claiming Hazard, by type of worker 
 
White Hispan Woman Married
High-school 
dropout Bad health
FRA 6.6 13.4*** 13.3*** 14.0*** 13.9*** 14.1***
(4.4) (2.1) (2.5) (3.4) (2.2) (2.2)
FRA*interaction term 8.0 0.1 0.3 -0.7 -2.9 -3.9
(4.9) (6.0) (4.0) (4.1) (5.0) (4.8)
N 88229 88228 88229 88011 88106 88074
R² 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
Covered by 
health insurance 
from current or 
private job
Covered by 
spouse's health 
insurance
Pension available 
from the current 
job
Pension type is 
defined benefits
Above median 
wealth
Above median 
wage
FRA 12.3*** 14.2*** 13.2*** 22.1*** 5.7* 16.7***
(3.2) (2.1) (3.5) (3.7) (3.1) (2.6)
FRA*interaction term 2.3 -4.7 3.6 -11.8** 12.1*** -3.9
(4.0) (6.3) (4.4) (5.3) (4.0) (5.8)
N 87899 87014 66676 38787 88115 59566
R² 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.09 0.14 0.11
High TICS score
High episodic 
memory High numeracy High self control
Long financial 
planning horizon Risk averse
FRA 5.2 10.7*** 8.0** 6.8 11.5*** 16.7***
(5.0) (2.8) (3.1) (7.0) (3.6) (3.0)
FRA*interaction term 9.6* 5.7 12.2*** -1.6 3.2 -4.8
(5.5) (3.9) (4.3) (9.1) (4.3) (4.1)
N 86127 87105 69532 15394 86053 84070
R² 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
Interaction term: cognition and behavior
Interaction term: sociodemographics
Interaction terms: pension and job characteristics
  
Notes: see notes to Table 1. See equation (5.1) for the model specification. Each regression includes a full set of monthly age 
dummies and birth cohort dummies interacted with the interaction variable (one different interaction variable per 
regression).  
   
Table 6: Differential impact of FRA on SS Benefit Claiming Hazard, by type of worker 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
FRA*high wealth 9.6
(6.4)
FRA*defined benefits -13.3** -13.1**
(5.8) (5.8)
FRA*high numeracy 2.2
(6.1)
FRA*high memory 16.6***
(6.1)
FRA*high TICS 15.8
(9.7)
FRA*cognition index 2.1** 2.2*** 2.4*** 2.2***
(1.0) (0.8) (0.9) (0.8)
FRA*years of education 0.5 1.0 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.9
(1.0) (1.0) (0.8) (1.0) (0.8) (0.8) (1.0)
FRA*white 4.6 11.1 2.6 -2.0 2.8 2.4 -2.1
(7.7) (7.5) (6.3) (6.9) (6.3) (6.3) (8.2)
FRA*woman 7.6 10.6 0.5 3.2 0.5 -0.7 -0.7
(6.8) (6.5) (4.6) (5.2) (4.6) (4.6) (5.7)
FRA*married -0.9 -0.3 -3.1 0.2 -3.1 -3.4 0.5
(6.9) (7.0) (4.9) (5.4) (4.9) (4.9) (6.2)
FRA*(2nd quartile cognition index) 16.9*** 12.8
(6.5) (8.3)
FRA*(3rd quartile cognition index) 15.1** 7.8
(6.6) (7.8)
FRA*(4th quartile cognition index) 24.9*** 19.3**
(6.9) (8.2)
FRA*stressful job -6.8
(5.2)
FRA*physically demanding job 0.6
(4.7)
SS earnings test removal*cognition index -0.5
(0.3)
N 32709 32709 69892 54856 69892 69892 57904
R² 0.11 0.10 0.15 0.11 0.15 0.15 0.15
Claiming social security (OASI) benefits
 
Notes: see notes to Table 5.Each regression includes a full set of monthly age dummies and birth cohort dummies interacted with the different interaction variables, as well as a 
direct FRA effect.  Column (7) excludes workers born in 1938 and 1939. 
